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[I] Abstract: As technology advances, the threat of rampant and
unprecedented theft of digital media continues to grow. The music
industry has already faced, and continues to face, this threat, but has
largely failed in defending musicians’ intellectual property.
[II] With the advent and increasing popularity of high-speed Internet
connections, Hollywood faces the same dilemma and is fighting back. As
a Time magazine writer recently noted,
Studio executives, no strangers to melodrama, have begun
to talk about movie piracy the way FBI agents talk about
terrorism: they watch the Web for “chatter,” they embed
films with hidden “fingerprints,” and they speak without
irony about “changing hearts and minds.” They even use
night-vision goggles. It’s not going too far to say they are
completely paranoid, which doesn’t mean they are wrong.3
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[III] Indeed, the battle rages. But is guerilla warfare the best method to
fight a “menace” that may represent Hollywood’s greatest opportunity?
To ensure success on ongoing profitability, the movie industry must mind
the lessons of the music industry’s failures, forge its own path, and
embrace the wonder that is the Internet. This article examines the music
industry’s efforts to fight e-piracy, discusses Hollywood’s limited efforts
and perhaps Hollywood’s only remaining viable alternative in fighting, or
embracing, this growing menace.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The Internet has changed the world. Never before has mankind
communicated on such an immense scale or had endless information at its
fingertips. But with advancement comes the specter of unprecedented
exploitation.
[2] Underscoring the lack, or inadequacy, of Internet regulation, Internet
users circumvent established laws, notably the Copyright Act of 1976,4
with impunity. Despite the well-publicized litigation in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,5 web-surfers in the United States and around the
world continue to share copyrighted digital media files such as MP3 files.6
[3] The e-pirate’s adventure, however, is growing riskier as the music and
movie industries are increasingly aiming their cannons away from Internet
server providers (“ISPs”) and taking aim at minors and unsuspecting
parents. As the above quote suggests, e-piracy is prompting the music and
movie industries to take drastic measures to fend off this burgeoning
threat. Technology has made it possible to pirate both movies and music
in little time, with little effort and with little to no quality distortion.
According to both industries, ever-changing and advancing technological
“innovations” are decreasing sales and costing jobs.7 As a result of epiracy, the music industry lost approximately $2.4 billion in 2003, and the
film industry loses approximately $3 billion every year.8
[4] E-piracy is clearly theft. For many, however, downloading music and
movies onto one’s private computer does not pain the conscience as does
walking out of a store with a CD or DVD under one’s coat. Accordingly,
the music industry is shifting its attention towards litigation, education and
efficient profit-making services. However, convincing Internet users that
downloading violates copyright law (a fact lost on many pre-teen or
teenaged e-pirates) and is no different than pilfering compact discs from
4

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000).
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
6
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
7
See Lev Grossman, It’s All Free!; Music! Movies! TV shows! Millions of People
Download Them Every Day. Is Digital Piracy Killing the Entertainment Industry?, TIME,
May 5, 2003, at 60, 60-63.
8
Ripley, supra note 3, at 56; Study: Music Piracy Has 5 Years of Growth, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 23, 2003, at 12.
5
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one’s favorite music shop, is an immense challenge. The process is slow,
and meanwhile the industries and artists continue to lose money.9
Fortunately for both industries, Congress is aware of the rampant
lawlessness and is acting, albeit limitedly, in response.10 The music
industry (and to a lesser degree Hollywood) is not sitting idly by while its
coffer is raided; it continues to materialize its educational and commercial
efforts against piracy. The music industry has filed numerous suits against
ISPs and individual users in an effort to stop illegal downloading and
demonstrate its resolve.11 In contrast, Hollywood’s litigation efforts are
moving more slowly, perhaps because technological developments have
only recently allowed DVD downloading with ease and speed.12 In 2003,
4.3 million households in North America upgraded to broadband,13 and
from March 2002 to March 2003, the percentage of American households
with high-speed connections rose from 21% to 31%.14 Currently, 39% of
all adult Internet users have high-speed Internet access at home.15
[5] Hollywood has the opportunity to learn valuable lessons about
combating the negative effects of e-commerce, and its potential financial
benefits, from the music industry’s failed model. Although the movie
industry launched nearly 3000 private investigations across the United
States in 2003,16 Hollywood has failed to establish a unified front in the

9

See Matthew C. Mousley, Note, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment
Industry’s Arsenal in its War on Digital Piracy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 674 (2003).
10
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (includes criminal offenses, specifically
criminal infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (includes circumvention of copyright
protection systems).
11
See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal.
2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
12
Christian John Pantages, Avast Ye, Hollywood! Digital Motion Picture Piracy
Comes of Age, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW 155, 163 (Winter 2002).
13
Larry Dobrow, Broadband Growth Numbers Spur Contention (August 6, 2004), at
http://www.mediapost.com/dtls_dsp_news.cfm?cb=050942P&newsID=263077&newsDa
te=08/06/2004 (last visited October 3, 2004).
14
Beatrice E. Garcia, More Users Surfing Web at High Speed, MIAMI HERALD, May
19, 2003, at 3A, available at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/5892656.htm?template=contentModules/
printstory.jsp.
15
Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, MPAA Launches New
Phase of Aggressive Education Campaign Against Movie Piracy (June 15, 2004), at
http://www.respectcopyrights.com/FINAL_6-15-04_STOPP_%20Press_Release.doc.
16
See Tom Hays, Cop Shooting Casts Light on Piracy Battle (June 19, 2004), at
http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php?story=04/06/21/1528235.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 1

17

fight against e-piracy. In order to ensure success, Hollywood must forge
its own path while minding the mistakes and missed opportunities of the
music industry. Hollywood must view the Internet as an opportunity to be
exploited, and not waste valuable resources and squander public goodwill
in its jealous effort to protect the property rights of artists.
II. STEMMING THE TIDE: COPYRIGHT LAW
[6] To promote the arts and sciences, the U.S. Constitution provides
intellectual property creators with exclusive rights to their works for a
limited duration.18 To further effectuate the Constitution’s purpose, the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) provides that a copyright lasts
for the artist’s lifetime plus seventy years.19 The copyright owner may
control certain uses of his work20 and can bring legal action if this
copyright is violated.21 Remedies for copyright violations include
injunctions, monetary damages and criminal penalties.22 The Copyright
Act, however, provides exceptions for uses in fields such as education and
research.23
[7] In the last decade, the Copyright Act has been amended to include
provisions that focus on digital piracy.24 In 1997, the aptly-named No
Electronic Theft Act (“NETA”) imposed criminal liability on providers of
free access to copyrighted works.25 Although NETA originally penalized
only those who realized commercial advantage or private financial gain, it
currently penalizes those who merely provide access.26
[8] The Copyright Act’s second amendment, 1998’s Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),27 provides greater protection against
17

See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp.
2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (granting defendant
software vendors’ motions for summary judgment on claims of copyright infringement).
18
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
20
Id. § 106 (listing the exclusive rights of copyright owners).
21
Id. § 501(b).
22
Id. § 506; 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000).
23
17 U.S.C. §§ 107-08 (2000).
24
Mousley, supra note 9, at 678.
25
See 17 U.S.C. § 505(a).
26
Mousley, supra note 9, at 678.
27
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1122 Stat. 2680 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.)
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infringement accomplished through encryption circumvention.28 The
DMCA enacted following the adoption of the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty29 and aids the fight against recent
technological developments that provide access to digital media via digital
code breaking, including various DVD copying applications.30 The
DMCA penalizes efforts to “circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected [by United States
Copyright Law].”31 Additionally it is unlawful under the DMCA to
“manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that .
. . is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a [protected]
work.”32 For repeat offenders, the DMCA imposes fines of up to $1
million and prison terms up to ten years.33 Since its passage, the DMCA
has become an important, hotly-litigated, and repeatedly contested weapon
against copyright infringement.34
[9] Additionally, the DMCA’s subpoena provision has been used to
identify individual copyright violators by commandeering ISPs’ user IP
lists.35 However, the Verizon decision in late 2003, discussed below, dealt
a serious blow to the music industry’s effort to identify and pursue alleged
violators.
III. THE MUSIC INDUSTRY FIGHTS BACK
A. Direct Hit! - A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
[10] The recording industry began its attack by seeking preliminary
injunctions against sites that made copyrighted music available to web
28

See Mousley, supra note 9, at 679.
World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65; see also 321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
1093-94 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
30
Mousley, supra note 9, at 680.
31
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000); see also Mousley, supra note 9, at 679.
32
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2000); see also Mousley, supra note 9, at 679.
33
§ 1204(a)(2); see also Mousley, supra note 9, at 679.
34
See Mousley, supra note 9, at 680 (discussing criticism and consumer group
opponents of the DMCA).
35
17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2000); see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon
Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a subpoena could be
issued only to an ISP engaged in storing on its servers material that was infringing or the
subject of infringing activity, and not to a mere conduit ISP).
29
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users. The first breakthrough was the well-publicized injunction against
Napster, Inc.,37 which led to Napster’s eventual downfall. Napster’s
website allowed users to download music from Napster-run “host users”
for free.38 Napster’s server software enabled users to search and locate the
MP3 files of other users.39 It then communicated the Internet address of
the “host user” to the requesting user, and this connection allowed users to
download directly from the other’s computer, a process called “peer-topeer” (“P2P”) networking.40 In 2001, A&M Records, Inc. (“A&M”) filed
suit against Napster, alleging contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement, and sought a preliminary injunction.41
[11] First, A&M claimed that Napster was liable for contributory
copyright infringement because Napster not only knew its users were
using its software to illegally download copyrighted music, but it
facilitated such conduct.42 Second, A&M claimed that Napster was
vicariously liable for infringement.43
[12] To be contributively liable for infringement, Napster had to “‘know
or have reason to know’ of direct infringement” by its users and contribute
to such conduct.44 The court found that Napster had both actual and
constructive knowledge of the illegal activity.45 Such “actual” knowledge
was based largely on a memo written by co-founder Sean Parker,
emphasizing Napster’s “‘need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and
IP addresses ‘since they are exchanging pirated music.’”46 Additionally,
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) previously
informed Napster that more than 12,000 copyrighted songs were available
36

See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
(granting preliminary injunction and preliminarily enjoining defendant from enabling
Internet users to copy, download and distribute copyrighted music); see also MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003),
aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying plaintiffs’ actions for copyright
infringement against defendants software vendors due to lack of control over networks
and infringing use of users).
37
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
38
See id. at 1012.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1019.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1019-20.
45
Id. at 1020.
46
Id.
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on Napster’s site. “Constructive” knowledge was demonstrated by both
the fact that Napster executives themselves actively downloaded music as
well as Napster’s promotion of copyrighted works on its site.48
Accordingly, the court concluded that Napster had knowledge of direct
infringement, and the court found Napster contributively liable for
infringement for failing to halt such conduct.49 The court noted that
without Napster, its users would be unable to find and download
copyrighted music it made available, thus satisfying the second element:
contributing to the infringing conduct.50
[13] To be liable for vicarious infringement, Napster must have possessed
the “‘right and ability’” to supervise its users and must have had a
financial interest in the activity.51 The court found that Napster’s
customers were attracted to free copyrighted music facilitated through its
site, and as its customer roster increased, so did its profits.52 Thus,
Napster benefited financially.53 Additionally, the court found that Napster
had the ability to supervise and stop the illegal activity,54 despite its “lack
of user control” argument.55 On its website, Napster affirmed its “‘right to
refuse service and terminate accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not
limited to, if Napster believes that user conduct violates applicable law . . .
or for any reason in Napster’s sole discretion, with or without cause.’”56
Accordingly, Napster was found vicariously liable.57
[14] Napster defended its actions through the Copyright Act’s “Fair Use
Doctrine,”58 which allows use of copyrighted works for certain purposes,
including criticism, teaching, and research.59 In evaluating the doctrine’s
applicability, courts must examine: (1) the use’s purpose and character—
whether commercial or educational; (2) the “nature of the copyrighted

47

Id.
Id.
49
Id. at 1021-22.
50
Id. at 1022.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1023.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
See id. at 1020, 1023.
56
Id. at 1023.
57
Id. at 1024.
58
Id. at 1014.
59
17 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
48
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work”; (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion of used”; and (4)
the effect upon the potential market.60
[15] The court rejected Napster’s fair use argument, holding that merely
putting a work into a different format (i.e. transforming songs to a
downloadable format) is not “fair use.”61 Moreover, the copyrighted work
was used for commercial, rather than personal, purposes.62 Additionally,
when analyzed with respect to market effect, Napster harmed the market
by reducing music sales and preventing the music industry from
succeeding online.63 After rejecting Napster’s arguments, and finding it
liable for contributory and vicarious infringement, the court enjoined
Napster’s operations based on A&M’s showing of likelihood of success
and irreparable harm if the conduct continued.64
[16] In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower
court’s decision and ruled that any copyrighted works had to be removed
from Napster’s site.65 This ruling prompted musicians such as Metallica
to file complaints against Napster demanding removal of their music.66
Later that year, the once-mighty Napster was forced to shut down its site.67
[17] After its shut down in June 2001, Napster collaborated with
MusicNet to make its music available through subscription services.68
However, in 2002, the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was
sold to BMG for $8 million.69
[18] While the Napster holding appeared to deliver the coup de grace to
ISPs that store and distribute copyrighted works, in the face of providers
that utilize the P2P model, its applicability has been limited.
60

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
Id. at 1015.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 1016.
64
Id. at 1029.
65
Id.
66
BBC News, Metallica Joins New Napster Attack (Mar. 29, 2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/new_media/1249347.stm (last visited June 21,
2004).
67
Associated Press, Napster Still Offline (July 21, 2001), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/07/12/tech/main301149.shtml.
68
Michael Singer, Napster Joins MusicNet Service (June 6, 2001), at
http://wwwInternetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/77981 (last visited June 21, 2004).
69
Michael Singer, Napster Sold for $8 Million (May 17, 2002), at
http://siliconvalley.Internet.com/news/article.php/1140801 (last visited June 21, 2004).
61
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B. Return Fire! - MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
[19] In MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the court faced essentially the same
issue posed in Napster: whether the defendants were liable for
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement.70 However, Grokster,
Ltd. (“Grokster”) and StreamCast Networks, Inc. (“StreamCast”),
distributors of Morpheus software, avoided liability due to their loose
control over users’ conduct.71
[20] Grokster, like Napster, provides downloadable software.72 In
contrast to Napster, however, Grokster’s role ends once a user is
connected to the network, as the user then shares files via P2P
networking.73 Moreover, when users search and transfer files using
Grokster software, they do so without utilizing Grokster computers.74
Thus, when a user logs off, the user’s music is no longer available.75 This
severance allows Grokster and StreamCast to remain ignorant as to what
music is available at any given time.76 If Grokster shuts down, users can
still share files with no interruption.77
[21] Although the Grokster court determined that the defendants
purposely ignored user names and IP addresses, it did not hold Grokster
liable for contributory infringement, finding that once Grokster distributed
the software, it could not control whether the software will be used for
unlawful purposes.78
IV. RECORDING INDUSTRY’S POST-GROKSTER STRATEGIES
[22] The key difference between Napster and Grokster is centralized
control over user conduct. Grokster’s P2P structure prevented centralized
control; thus, there was no central Grokster server to indicate which files
had been downloaded.79 While Napster relied on centralized
70

Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
Id.
72
Id. at 1032.
73
Id. at 1040.
74
Id.
75
Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
76
See id.
77
Id. at 1041.
78
Id. at 1043.
79
Id. at 1040.
71
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communication architecture to identify available MP3 files, the current
generation of P2P programs allows users to search MP3 libraries of others
directly through downloaded software with no website involved.80
[23] Similarly, the court found that Grokster was not vicariously liable.81
As noted, vicarious infringement extends liability to those who have a
right and ability to supervise infringing activity and a direct financial
interest in those activities.82 Knowledge is not a requirement.83 Although
Grokster derived benefit through advertising, it had no control over its
product’s use.84 Thus, it lacked the ability to supervise.85
[24] The Grokster decision underscores the importance of control.
Without evidence of control over the ability to download copyrighted
music, courts will not likely hold a provider liable, regardless of whether it
remained ignorant of user activity. Not surprisingly, other operations, like
KaZaa and Gnutella, have exploited the de-centralized P2P model.86
[25] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the
district court’s decision in Grokster.87 It appears that P2P sharing, from
the application provider’s perspective, does not violate anti-infringement
laws and that these providers are safe barring an appeal and adverse ruling
by the Supreme Court or contrary legislation from Congress. The movie
industry currently faces a similar attack, and Napster and Grokster hold
important lessons for Hollywood in its effort to stem movie piracy
perpetrated via P2P networks.
[26] In light of the Grokster failure, as well as the increase of P2P
popularity, the RIAA is now pursuing individual users.88 In the summer
80

Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Douglas Litchman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for
Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 403,
408-09 (2003)).
81
Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
82
Id. (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022).
83
Id. (citing Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049
(C.D. Cal. 2001)).
84
Id. at 1044-45.
85
Id. at 1045-46.
86
See Grossman, supra note 7, at 60.
87
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004).
88
John Borland, New RIAA File-swapping Suits Filed, CNET News, (Mar. 23,
2004). at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5177933.html.
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of 2003, the music industry commenced a widespread, yet selective,
offensive against individual downloaders.89 The RIAA has since sued
over 1900 users, with more than 400 users paying fines averaging $3000.90
In March 2004, the RIAA brought an additional 532 lawsuits against
anonymous users, including eighty-nine individuals from universities.91
However, the RIAA was recently prohibited from bringing a single action
against hundreds of anonymous users.92 Instead, it must sue individually
using the expensive and tedious “John Doe” method.93 Despite this
setback, the RIAA continues its fight.94
[27] The RIAA’s efforts have moved beyond U.S. borders to Australia,
the home of KaZaa. 95 In March 2003, the Music Industry Privacy
Investigations unit96 obtained a court order allowing it to raid KaZaa’s
headquarters and executives’ homes.97 However, the RIAA was told that
it could not review the seized documents until the matter resumed in U.S.
federal court in the summer of 2004.98 Nonetheless, while the RIAA
continues the lengthy process of building its case, KaZaa remains a
popular site for downloading music, though Nielsen/Netratings show that
the lawsuit has had an effect on usage.99

89

Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, The High Cost of Sharing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
2003, at B1.
90
Borland, supra note 88.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Abby Dinham, Sharman May Appeal Court Ruling, CNET News, (Mar. 4, 2004),
at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5170198.html
96
The MIPI is run by the Australian Recording Industry Association to oversee all
music piracy issues in the music industry. Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission, Music Industry Piracy Investigations: Description, at
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/288585/fromItemId/340639 (last
visited Sept. 4, 2004).
97
Sam Varghese, Kazaa Case: Access to Seized Materials Delayed, The Age, (Mar.
24, 2004), at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/03/24/1079939686550.html
98
Id.
99
“The Kazaa software, the most popular file-trading application, also saw usage fall
15 percent, from 6.5 million to 5.5 million unique users [the week ending June 29, 2004],
according to Neilson/Netratings.” John Borland, RIAA Threat May Be Slowing File
Swapping, CNET News, (July 14, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/RIAA+threat+may+be+slowing+file+swapping/2100-1027_31025684.html.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 1

[28] While the recording industry continues to combat the still-existing
sites that facilitate e-piracy, record sales continue to decline.100 Although
the decline slowed in 2003, retail sales dropped about 4.3%.101 One
suggested solution to remedy this decline is offering songs online to users
at a low price.102 Perhaps this is a wise move considering MP3 player
sales have increased 56%.103
[29] In 2003, Apple launched iTunes, which allows Mac and non-Mac
users to download songs for $0.99 each.104 Online music stores like
iTunes not only give consumers the option to download only the songs
they desire without having to buy an entire album, they allow artists to
release individual tracks without releasing a complete album.105 At the
conclusion of 2004’s first quarter, Apple reported that iTunes sold 50
million songs, with 2.5 million more songs downloaded every week.106
Following iTunes’ success, new competitors, including Roxio’s Napster
and MusicMatch, have entered the fray.107
[30] The RIAA is continuing its campaign to educate users concerning the
illegality of downloading pirated music. The message is simple: e-pirates
are breaking the law and possibly ruining the music industry, and if
consumers stop buying albums, the incentive for creativity evaporates
(assuming the traditional album is the only available medium of
expression). The RIAA’s campaign also emphasizes the effect that losses
have not just on artists, executives, and producers, but also on “lesser”
industry employees whose names never appear on a marquee.108
[31] The RIAA’s efforts appear to be working. According to a July 2004
survey, “64 percent of those surveyed believe it is illegal to make music
from the computer available for others to download for free.”109 While
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this figure may indicate a true change in perception, it remains to be seen
whether such knowledge equates to any decrease in illegal downloading.
Film and music downloading sites and software applications are still quite
popular; KaZaa was once downloaded more than 1.9 million times in a
single week.110
[32] The “education method” may have another important advantage:
avoiding the ire of Internet terrorists. In March 2004, the RIAA’s website
shut down for five days due to a “MyDoom” virus attack .111 Other attacks
have occurred since 2002, when the music industry commenced its robust
efforts to combat e-piracy.112
[33] A final novel anti-piracy strategy is “spoofing.” Spoofing inundates
peer-to-peer networks with fake MP3 files that look exactly like valid
files.113 Once downloaded, the user attempts to listen to the music, and the
“spoofed” MP3 either plays a damaged recording, an advertisement to buy
the track, or nothing.114 The hope is that users will become frustrated and
deterred from illegally downloading and instead take advantage of new,
legal, downloading options. Despite these efforts, e-piracy continues to be
a pervasive problem, and is now approaching the shores of Hollywood in
full force.
V. HOLLYWOOD FIGHTS BACK
[34] Though it took some time, high-speed Internet access and e-piracy
ingenuity have caught up to the movie industry. Where it was once
impractical to download an entire movie, this now can be done much more
quickly.115 Using a dial-up Internet connection, a user can download a
movie in twenty-four hours, but a high-speed user can acquire a complete
full-feature film in as little as one hour.116 The question remains whether
110
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the music industry’s tactics (i.e., litigation, education, and even spoofing)
will aid the movie industry’s battle to reclaim its annual $3 billion loss to
illegal Internet activity.117 Its first line of defense, encryption, has already
been breached.
A. Nightmare on E-Street: DeCSS, DivX, DVD-X and DVD-X Copy
[35] The distribution of digital versatile disks (“DVDs”) in the mid-1990s
subjected the movie industry to an increased threat of digital piracy.118
Foreseeing this possibility, DVD technology inventors Toshiba and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., created the Content Scramble
System (“CSS”), an encryption coding system designed to prevent
copying.119 Later, the DVD Copy Control Association, Inc., was created
to control the licensing of this innovation, but the code was quickly
broken.120
[36] In 1999, Jon Johansen (a.k.a. “DVD Jon”), a Norwegian teen
computer hacker, created a decryption code to counter CSS, known as
DeCSS.121 DeCSS enables individuals to copy DVDs to their hard drives,
in a manner similar to music downloads.122 Johansen claimed he
developed the code solely for non-infringing purposes, i.e., play-back of
already purchased DVDs.123 He subsequently made the technology
available on the web, providing widespread access to digitized movies.124
Although the widespread availability of DeCSS has sparked litigation
spurred by the movie industry, these actions have had seemingly little
effect on its disbursement.

117

Motion Picture Association of America, Statement on Anti-Piracy, at
http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
118
Pantages, supra note 12, at 162-63.
119
DVD Copy Control Ass’n. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 6 (Cal. 2003), rev’d, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
120
Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7.
121
Id.
122
Pantages, supra note 12, at 163.
123
See generally John Leyden, DVD Jon Is Free – Official, THE REGISTER (Jan. 7,
2003) (discussing the holding of the Norwegian court on the charges filed by the
Norwegian Economic Crime Unit against Jon Johansen for producing the DeCSS DVD
decryption utility), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/28749.html.
124
See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (discussing the posting of the DeCSS software by Jon
Johansen on the Internet to enable users to distribute movies).

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 1

[37] After his trial in Norway, urged partially by the Motion Picture
Association of America (“MPAA”),125 Johansen was acquitted of all
charges, including charges that DeCSS was an illegal technology and its
distribution over the Internet was illegal.126 Today, this decryption
technology is available on nearly one million Internet sites.127
[38] Adding to the ease of downloading, DivX, a new file compression
technology, allows a DVD to fit on a single CD that can be downloaded
within hours.128 DivX was copied from Microsoft by two hackers, and is
available through movie downloading sites.129 Although movie
downloading was originally difficult because of time and size,130 that is no
longer the case.
B. Decryption Technology Sparks Litigation
[39] The development and dissemination of DeCSS and DivX subjects
the movie industry to rampant piracy.131 It is estimated that approximately
400,000 to 600,000 movies are downloaded illegally each day.132 In
response, the MPAA, like the RIAA, has attacked DeCSS distributors in
court.133
[40] In two similar cases, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes and
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, the MPAA sought to enjoin
distributors from posting DeCSS and from creating hyperlinks to sites
where the software could be obtained.134 These cases were brought
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pursuant to the newly enacted DMCA, which explicitly provides that a
court “may grant temporary or permanent injunctions on such terms as it
deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation . . . .”136
[41] Under the DMCA, an effort to “circumvent a technological measure”
is defined as an effort “to descramble a scrambled work, decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright
owner.”137 Universal argued that DeCSS fell within the DMCA’s purview
since it was designed for the sole purpose of descrambling,138 thus
violating the DMCA.139 Agreeing with Universal, the court in both cases
granted injunctions,140 finding that “DeCSS, a computer program
unquestionably within the meaning of the statute . . . is a means of
circumventing a technological access control measure,” and thus, violates
the DMCA.141
[42] DeCSS distributors responded by challenging the DMCA’s validity,
asserting their First Amendment free speech right to post DeCSS
information on the web.142 More specifically, in Reimerdes and Corley,
these distributors claimed computer code is a form of expression deserving
constitutional protection.143 Although the court agreed that code is an
expression to those able to read it, the court found the restriction (i.e., the
injunction) was narrowly tailored so as to not impermissibly infringe on
the speaker’s constitutional rights.144
[43] In evaluating this claim, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and the District Court for the Southern District of New York had to first
determine whether an injunction would be content-based or contentneutral.145 A content-based injunction precludes speech based on its
substance, whereas a content-neutral injunction precludes speech
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regardless of substance. The two courts found the injunction on
decryption technology to be content-neutral, thus the decision on whether
it violated First Amendment rights required the court to balance the
distributors’ interest in providing the technology against the studio’s
interest in enjoining the action.147 Stated differently, the court had to
determine whether the injunction restricted no more First Amendment
freedoms than necessary to serve a significant government interest (i.e.,
copyright protection).”148
[44] Focusing on the DMCA’s purpose, the two courts determined that
the injunction would not regulate expression, but would regulate DeCSS’s
function as technology that promotes e-piracy.149 The Reimerdes court
accordingly stated that:
[a]s Congress’ concerns in enacting the antitrafficking provision of the DMCA were to
suppress copyright piracy and infringement
and to promote the availability of
copyrighted works in digital form, and not to
regulate the expression of ideas that might
be inherent in particular anti-circumvention
devices or technology, this provision of the
statute properly is viewed as content
neutral.150
[45] The court further noted that the consequences of allowing such
expression in the digital age would mean that such information could be
sent to Internet users all over the world in a short time, thus regulation is
necessary to further a substantial government interest.151
[46] Accordingly, the Reimerdes and Corley courts, and subsequent
decisions, determined that injunctions concerning DeCSS dissemination
are content-neutral restrictions necessary to further a substantial
government interest, and that the DMCA is sufficiently narrowly tailored
to regulate as little speech as necessary.152 Finally, satisfying the final
146
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element in the determination of whether to issue injunctions, the courts
found that irreparable harm would result should the injunctions not be
issued, primarily for two reasons.153 First, DeCSS effectively eliminates
DVD copyright protection, and thus without an injunction the studio
would be forced to either accept piracy or expend resources innovating.154
Second, the ability to download movies and then transfer and store the
media decreases studio revenue.155
[47] In February 2004, DVD-X and DVD-X COPY, popular decryption
programs similar to DeCSS and DivX, were also found to violate the
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions.156 In 321 Studios v. MGM, a
DVD-X and DVD-X COPY distributor157 sought a declaration that its
product did not violate the DMCA.158 MGM counterclaimed, seeking the
opposite.159
[48] After citing and discussing Reimerdes and Corley at length, the court
held that the software “avoided” and “bypassed” the DVD encoding
scheme, CSS, within the meaning of the DMCA’s provision proscribing
such circumvention.160 The court also rejected 321’s argument that
purchasers had permission to copy DVDs from the producers,161 and its
argument that copying merely constituted fair use.162 Accordingly, as
DVD-X and DVD-X COPY were held to violate the DMCA, the court
enjoined 321’s distribution of DVD-X and DVD-X COPY, and ordered
that the company stop manufacturing, distributing, or otherwise trafficking
153

Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
Id.
155
Id.
156
321 Studios v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
157
321 Studios is no stranger to controversy. Hollywood has had it under
scrutiny since the 2001 launch of its first product, DVD Copy Plus, which
makes lesser-quality CD copies of DVD movies. In April [of 2002], fearing the
MPAA’s wrath, 321 Studios preemptively sued nine major Hollywood movie
studios. The suit asks the court to rule that selling DVD Copy Plus does not
violate the DMCA. Tom Spring, New Tool Makes DVD Copying Easy; 321
Studios Challenges Hollywood, DMCA Again with Release of DVD X Copy, PC
WORLD (Dec. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0%2Caid%2C107637% 2C00.asp (last
visited Sept. 4, 2004).
158
321 Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1089-90.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1098; 17 U.S.C. §1201(b)(1).
161
321, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
162
Id. at 1101-02.
154

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 1

DVD circumvention software within seven days of its February 19, 2004,
order.163
[49] Despite the Reimerdes, Corley and 321 Studio rulings, it appears epirates have not been deterred. As history has shown, once the “genie is
out” (or once millions of copies of DeCSS, DivX, DVD-X and DVD-X
COPY are themselves available for illegal download), it is nearly
impossible to wrestle back into the lamp.164 Hollywood must find other
ways to fight e-piracy.
C. Preventive Measures
[50] To prevent losses resulting from premature dissemination of
potential hit movies, studios are taking drastic measures.165 In an effort to
stop Tom Cruise’s latest film, The Last Samurai, from making its way to
the Internet before the sneak preview, Warner Brothers hand-delivered
copies to projection rooms, searched theaters for recording devices,
installed metal detectors, searched for and seized cameras and camera
phones, and hired staff to walk the aisles with night-vision goggles.166
Though drastic, these measures proved effective — somewhat. Just days
after its theatrical release, bootleg copies began surfacing on the web.167
[51] Warner Brothers investigated and determined that the copy was
filmed via camcorder in a U.S. theater.168 An embedded tracking code
indicated the theater from which it originated, but the studio released no
specific information.169 Nonetheless, The Last Samurai’s release was a
success; however, as Warner Brothers later emphasized, its early web
availability indicates how pervasive e-piracy has become.170 Moreover,
the studio’s protective efforts underscore the frightening speed and
efficiency with which movies can find their way to the web.171
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[52] It is estimated that Hollywood lost $3.5 billion to illegal DVD
downloading in 2003.172 This loss is projected to increase to $5.4 billion
this year as the industry faces further technological development, which is
rapidly diminishing the time it takes to download a movie.173 Relatedly,
blank CD sales in 2001 were up 40% from the previous year, indicating
that blank CD demand has grown along with increased downloading
capabilities.174
[53] Despite technological “advances,” many of those engaged in movie
piracy feel that Hollywood has little to lose from this illegal downloading
compared to the effects endured by the recording industry.175 However,
with the continual improvement of downloading technology, Hollywood
studios will soon face the same problems.176 Hollywood should take
action now, perhaps something similar to the recording industry’s
remedial measures, to prevent the same lost revenues faced by the
recording industry.177 As discussed, the measures include litigation,
education, and “spoofing,” or lesser explored methods which espouse
(rather than combat) the technology.178 However, Hollywood must also
look to the enemy within.179
D. The Enemy Within – OscarTM Implicated
[54] An AT&T study published on September 13, 2003, Analysis of
Security Vulnerabilities in the Movie Production and Distribution
Process, examined the top fifty films in U.S. theaters that appeared online
between January 1, 2002, and June 27, 2003.180 The report evaluated web
versions of movies, analyzing both sound and picture quality, as well as
other effects of illegal copying and downloading.181 Further, the report
examined the dates when movies first appeared online in comparison with
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theatrical and home DVD/video release dates. The report then
hypothesized as to the online copies’ origins.183
[55] The study found that 77% of illegal copies originated within the
industry, seven films appeared on the Internet prior to their theatrical
release date, and 163 were available before the DVD/video release date.184
The study also identified time periods when most leaks occurred: the twoweek period surrounding the movie’s theatrical release and the three-week
period leading to DVD/video release.185
[56] The results were shocking; the most privileged members of the film
industry were perhaps its biggest threat. But with a materialized threat
comes an acquirable target. In early 2004, the FBI made its first movie
bootlegging arrest.186 The twist—the accused, Russell William Sprague,
received “screeners” from actor and Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and
Sciences (“the Academy”) member Carmine Caridi.187 The movies Caridi
sent Sprague included The Last Samurai, Something’s Gotta Give, and Big
Fish.188 Caridi sent the movies to Sprague, who copied them to DVD and
returned the original movies to Caridi.189
[57] Last year, in anticipation of bootlegging, the MPAA banned screener
DVDs.190 However, the ban was lifted after a court granted a temporary
injunction to independent production companies that claimed the ban left
them disadvantaged because their movies are not widely distributed.191 In
response, the Academy now requires OscarTM voters to agree to keep the
screeners for their private viewing, threatening expulsion from the
Academy as a consequence for a violation.192
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E. If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em – Hollywood Goes On-Line
[58] To combat e-piracy and cash-in on the Internet, Hollywood has
entered the online marketplace.193 One distributor, Movielink, offers
downloadable movies to pay-per-view members for $4-$5.194 Once a user
chooses a movie, he can view it at any point during the next thirty days,
but once the file is opened, it must be watched within twenty-four hours or
it will be automatically deleted.195 In addition, the downloaded film is
encrypted196 to prevent a customer from burning the movie to DVD.
[59] The industry must now consider whether this alternative will convert
current illegal downloaders. Today, a movie can be downloaded in hours,
for free, and burned onto DVD before it is in theaters.197 While such acts
are illegal, the movie industry, unlike the music industry, has yet to
prosecute illegal downloaders or create effective and profitable online
alternatives. For the time being there appears to be nothing stopping epirates from taking advantage of free movies. The only advantage to the
“legal” on-line consumer over using a pay-per-view service is an earlier
release date. Thus, Movielink and others may find themselves in direct
competition with video stores, while offering little benefit to traditional
movie rental (other than not having to leave one’s house).198
[60] Other “for-pay services” have entered the online market. However,
the services available continue to restrict what members can do with the
media.199 To keep pace with illegal downloading, the music and movie
industries must create better pay services.
F. Education - “Movies: They’re Worth It”
[61] In an effort to avoid the declining sales faced by the recording
industry, the MPAA is striving to educate consumers about the effects of
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illegally downloading movies.
Such efforts include the creation of two
MPAA websites, www.respectcopyrights.org and www.mpaa.com/antipiracy, and various trailers shown at theaters portraying e-piracy’s
collateral effects.201
[62] The MPAA’s site, www.respectcopyrights.org, covers four effects of
illegal movie downloading: direct harm to consumers if movies fail to
make money, the effect movie decline will have on off-screen employees,
computer vulnerability, and criminal risk.202
i. You are cheating yourself!
[63] First, the MPAA highlights the effects on the consumer.203 The
MPAA claims bootlegged movies lack quality, since they are often
recorded by a camcorder.204 Poor quality, the MPAA believes, should
deter illegal downloading since the movie loses the “real movie
experience.”205
[64] Moreover, if illegal downloading continues, fewer people will go to
the movies and the number of profitable movies will decline.206 As a
result, studios will be forced to make fewer films, which, in turn, will
harm consumer options.207 Even now, according to the MPAA, only four
out of every ten films make a profit.208
[65] This sympathy-garnering effort, from an industry earning billions of
dollars a year, appears to be receiving only a lukewarm reception. It is
suggested that while users might agree that studios could stop making
movies to cover their losses, studios will lack sympathy from consumers
as long as top stars continue to earn millions of dollars per film.
200
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ii. You are threatening the livelihood of thousands!
[66] As the MPAA suggests, people other than actors, directors and
producers are involved in the movie-making process.209 Although illegal
downloading may not be deterred by the studios or the major players—
actors, executives and directors—losing money, the MPAA hopes that for
the harm e-piracy causes, consumers will appreciate that workers behindthe-scenes are at risk.210
[67] Accordingly, the MPAA has produced several theatrical trailers,
exhibiting various behind-the-scene workers discussing their jobs and the
effects movie piracy will have on themselves and over 500,000 others in
the field if illegal downloading continues.211 These workers include a
stunt man, a set painter, and a make-up artist.212 Obviously, these trailers
are another attempt to garner sympathy from consumers who may
otherwise feel justified in downloading movies, considering the fortunes
made by some in the industry. The trailers’ effects remain to be seen.
iii. Your computer is vulnerable!
[68] Movie downloading, like music downloading, can be accomplished
through P2P networking.213 Though convenient and free, P2P networking
has risks, including virus and worm susceptibility.214 Personal
information, such as bank records and social security numbers, may be
compromised.215 Also, once a user downloads a file, he may himself,
perhaps unknowingly, become a pirated movie distributor and expose
himself to civil and criminal liability.216
[69] This fear factor, however, is unlikely to be a deterrent. Arguably,
users know the risk of viruses and worms, but accept it by merely logging
onto the web everyday. If Hollywood continues to be uncommitted to
prosecuting violators civilly and criminally, its empty admonitions will
continue to fall on deaf ears.
209
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iv. You are breaking the law!
[70] If caught, an e-pirate is subject to stiff penalties and fines; possibly
years in prison and thousands of dollars in fines.217 However, there is not
yet a set precedent for enforcement of pirated movies that would lead
individuals to believe such conduct has real consequences.
[71] In addition to the MPAA’s four claimed effects,
www.respectcopyrights.org also includes information regarding a new
campaign sponsored by the MPAA and headed by Junior Achievement,
Inc., entitled What’s the Diff?, which is available to middle school
students.218 Its purpose is to educate young people about the need to
protect copyrights and to attach a stigma to illegal downloading.219 The
MPAA also provides links to profit-making websites where users can
download movies legally, for a fee, including Cinemanow, Ifilm,
Movieflix, and Movielink.220
VI. RECENT E-PIRACY LEGISLATION
[72] The MPAA currently backs proposed legislation designed to impose
strict penalties on e-piracy.221 One proposal, an expansion of the No
Electronic Theft Act, the Artists’ Rights and Theft Prevention Act
(“ARTPA”), would increase fines and prison sentences.222 ARTPA
specifically imposes harsher penalties on those who create or obtain
movies prior to their theatrical release.223 Hollywood’s profits come from
a carefully choreographed timing of distribution of the film across a
variety of media, anchored by a film’s theatrical release; thus, the
incentive to curb illegal pre-release dissemination.224
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[73] Additionally, “starting in July 2005, all digital video-recording
devices—including digital VCRs and digital tuners—will recognize a
‘broadcast flag’ encoded in the digital television stream. Recorders must
then encode a flagged program so it cannot be shared from machine to
machine or over the Internet.”225 This regulation is partially aimed at
curbing the MPAA’s problem of illegal redistribution of broadcast
television.226 For now, the MPAA backs the federal regulation, but
opponents suggest the measures are constitutionally over inclusive and
could include benign activities such as taping a show for a friend.227
Finally, the proposed Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, would “ban
unauthorized recording in movie theaters and includes harsh penalties if
pre-released movies are swapped on P2P networks.”228
VII. RECENT LITIGATION – RIAA V. VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES, INC.
[74] To pursue apparent copyright infringers, the RIAA must individually
identify the users using P2P programs who share and trade files.229 The
RIAA can easily find a user’s screen name and trace the user to his ISP
with his associated IP address.230 But only the ISP can link the IP with a
name and address. Once the link is made, the RIAA can contact, or even
sue, the person.231
[75] Prior to Verizon, the RIAA frequently used the DMCA’s subpoena
provision232 to “compel ISPs to disclose the names of subscribers whom
the RIAA believed were infringing its members’ copyrights.”233 Some
ISPs complied with the RIAA’s subpoenas and identified subscribers’
names, and using the acquired information, the RIAA sent letters to and
filed lawsuits against several hundred infringing individuals, “each of
whom allegedly made available for download hundreds or in some cases
225
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thousands of .mp3 files.”
One such targeted ISP was Verizon Internet
Services. Verizon, however, drew a line in the sand, and in the summer of
2002 refused to comply with an RIAA subpoena.235
[76] In defending its actions, Verizon argued that the DMCA precludes
issuance of subpoenas to ISPs that merely act as conduits for P2P
communications, since the subpoena request could not meet the
requirement that such subpoenas contain “a copy of a notification [of
claimed infringement, as] described in § 512(c)(3)(A).”236 In particular,
Verizon maintained that the RIAA’s two subpoenas did not meet the
requirements since Verizon is not storing the infringing material on its
server, and it could not identify material “to be removed or access to
which is to be disabled.”237 Since § 512(h)(4) makes satisfaction of the
notification requirement a condition precedent to issuance, Verizon’s
argument continued, the subpoenas were deficient.238
[77] The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, following
the Napster and Grokster logic, agreed with Verizon and held that DMCA
subpoenas may only be issued to ISPs engaged in storing infringing
material, and not to those merely acting as conduits.239 As the court
explained, the subpoena validity depends upon the copyright holder
having given the ISP effective notification under § 512(c)(3)(A).240 Thus,
a subpoena may not be issued to a provider acting as a conduit for P2P
sharing, which does not involve media storage.241
[78] As the court sympathetically noted, the problem for the RIAA (and
presumably the MPAA) lies in the language of the DMCA itself.242
Congress did not likely foresee the application of § 512 to P2P file sharing
when the DMCA was drafted, and had it foreseen P2P’s development, it
may have drafted the DMCA more broadly.243 For the time being,
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however, issuance of § 512 subpoenas to an ISP acting as a P2P conduit is
barred.244
[79] Hollywood is losing its war against P2P conduits on two fronts.
According to Grokster, ISP activities that facilitate P2P sharing are
lawful245 and, according to Verizon, their IP lists are secure.246 So what
now for Hollywood? Wait for Congress to act? Perhaps, such action was
all but urged by the Verizon court:
The stakes are large for the music, motion picture, and
software industries and their role in fostering technological
innovation and our popular culture. It is not surprising,
therefore, that even as this case was being argued
[September 16, 2003], committees of the Congress were
considering how best to deal with the threat to copyrights
posed by P2P file sharing schemes.247
[80] Unfortunately, Congressional action will always be a step behind
technological innovation. Rather, Hollywood must stop sailing against the
wind and view the Internet for what it is: an opportunity. Hollywood must
continue its educational efforts and provide superior online alternatives to
illegal downloading, or hope that Congress acts to protect its shores. It
must become the innovator.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – HIDDEN TREASURE
[81] To date, Hollywood’s efforts to fight illegal downloading have not
matched those of the recording industry—perhaps a wise move. It is
difficult to foresee whether, and to what extent, the recording industry’s
litigation efforts will pay off. What is apparent is the increasing
popularity of legal music and movie downloading operations, perhaps a
result of the recording industry and Hollywood’s education efforts. For
example, Apple’s iTunes has sold millions of songs, and other competitors
are entering the market.248 Also, a recent report indicated that traditional
music sales were up 9.1% over the first three months of 2004, compared
with the first three months of 2003.249
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[82] Unlike the recording industry, Hollywood’s main focus appears to be
consumer education. On June 14, 2004, the MPAA announced that it was
launching a new phase of “aggressive education” concerning movie
piracy.250 According to an MPAA press release:
The new phase will feature ads in daily newspapers and
consumer magazines across the country, as well as in more
than 100 college newspapers. It will also include reaching
out to parents, students and local groups to explain why
movie piracy is illegal, how it impacts jobs and the
economy and the consequences of engaging in illegal
trafficking. Additionally, in the coming months, antipiracy messages will appear in motion picture theaters
across the country.251
[83] MPAA president Jack Valenti further noted:
We hope this ramped-up information/educational campaign
will cause those who are taking films without permission to
stop their illegal activity. But we will keep all of our
options open, including legal action. If we don’t react
promptly to an ascending curve of illegal uploading and
downloading soon to be reinforced with dazzling speeds
rising from file-trafficking networks, we will live with an
intense regret. We have to do more to convince that
minority of people who are engaged in this unlawful and
infringing activity of the wrongness of their conduct. We
have to stem the tide of film theft online before it is too
late, before it puts to peril the creative energy of the
industry and the jobs of the nearly one million Americans
who work within the movie industry.252
[84] Valenti is correct; hackers and e-pirates will continue to circumvent
and distribute. But he may be incorrect about stemming the tide before it
is too late—it may be too late. As mentioned previously, 400,000 to
600,000 movies are illegally downloaded each day, and 39% of all adult
Internet users (24% of all adult Americans) have high-speed Internet
access at home.253
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[85] Along with its educational efforts, Hollywood must focus on
capitalizing on the Internet’s potential, perhaps using iTunes as a model.
It is still unclear whether users will be affected by trailer warnings
concerning illegal downloading, but consumers will always be interested
in receiving a superior product. Hollywood, however, must address its
continuing inability to release online movies sooner and concentrate on
education as well as capitalization. With such access and seemingly
ineffective litigation efforts, the MPAA’s difficulty in deterring illegal
downloading is not surprising. Thus, Hollywood must remain focused on
both education and capitalization.
[86] To capitalize on the online phenomenon, Hollywood must innovate
and distribute faster, must offer better services, and should not waste
valuable resources and damage public goodwill by pursuing e-pirates in
court. So far the MPAA has wisely refused to join the legal offensive,
perhaps hoping to reap the benefits associated with high-profile music
lawsuits without having to take the heat from outraged parents and
consumers.254 This decision may be doubly wise since Verizon, as
Hollywood would now find great difficulty in acquiring large numbers of
individual targets for infringement lawsuits.255 If Hollywood wishes to
litigate, however, it should attack those responsible for the initial
dissemination: the scrupulous insiders discussed above.
[87] Meanwhile, while Hollywood refuses to modernize and capitalize on
the goldmine at their fingertips, technology continues to decrease
download time, and the number of computers flying the Jolly Roger
grows.
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